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Lightweight Break-Glass Access Control System
for Healthcare Internet-of-Things
Yang Yang , Member, IEEE, Ximeng Liu , Member, IEEE, and Robert H. Deng , Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Healthcare Internet-of-things (IoT) has been
proposed as a promising means to greatly improve the effi-
ciency and quality of patient care. Medical devices in health-
care IoT measure patients’ vital signs and aggregate these
data into medical files which are uploaded to the cloud for
storage and accessed by healthcare workers. To protect pa-
tients’ privacy, encryption is normally used to enforce ac-
cess control of medical files by authorized parties while
preventing unauthorized access. In healthcare, it is crucial
to enable timely access of patient files in emergency situ-
ations. In this paper, we propose a lightweight break-glass
access control (LiBAC) system that supports two ways for
accessing encrypted medical files: attribute-based access
and break-glass access. In normal situations, a medical
worker with an attribute set satisfying the access policy of
a medical file can decrypt and access the data. In emergent
situations, the break-glass access mechanism bypasses the
access policy of the medical file to allow timely access to the
data by emergency medical care or rescue workers. LiBAC
is lightweight since very few calculations are executed by
devices in the healthcare IoT network, and the storage and
transmission overheads are low. LiBAC is formally proved
secure in the standard model and extensive experiments
are conducted to demonstrate its efficiency.
Index Terms—Access control, break-glass, healthcare
system, lightweight, secure Internet-of-Things (IoT).
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I. INTRODUCTION
INTERNET-OF-THINGS (IoT) is a novel paradigm [1], [2]for modern pervasive wireless communications, which con-
nects a variety of physical devices through the Internet to collect
and exchange data. A healthcare IoT network [3], [4] consisting
of smart sensors on wearable health devices and medical
instruments (such as heart monitoring implants and biochip
transponders) can remotely monitor a patient’s health condi-
tions. The wearable or implantable sensors in healthcare IoT are
normally equipped with very limited battery supply. Frequent
charging of many sensors and mobile medical devices may
fatigue the frail patients and the engaged nurses, which greatly
reduces user experience. Furthermore, some implantable body
sensors (such as cardiac pacemaker) are difficult or even im-
possible to be charged, and the patient’s life is threatened when
the wireless medical devices ran out of power. Thus, operations
in the healthcare IoT should be lightweight to save the battery.
Medical devices in healthcare IoT measure patients’ vital
signs and aggregate these data into a medical file. The storage
capability of health IoT is limited and the accumulative medical
files have to be stored in a third party storage. Cloud computing
[5], [6] is a new Internet-based computing paradigm to provide
shared processing and storage resources to customers, and en-
ables ubiquitous and on-demand data access. The medical files
are suitable to be stored in the cloud platform to save the local
storage cost and enjoy the convenient data access service. Since
medical files contain sensitive physiological data, access control
over outsourced files is essential to prohibit unauthorized data
access.
Standard access control mechanisms, however, are not de-
signed to deal with emergency situations, which are quite com-
mon in healthcare. In emergency situations, for example, when
a patient suffers from a heart attack or suddenly fainted, the
patient loses consciousness and is unavailable to grant access
privilege to the first-aid rescuers, which may lead to delayed
treatment or even death. It is crucial to realize a break-glass
access mechanism for the emergency situations in order to save
patient’s lives [7]. The term “break-glass” means that someone
is not designated to execute the task but gains authorization
for the task in exceptional scenarios, which is derived from the
action of breaking the glass and ringing the fire alarm [23].
Break-glass access is a mechanism to bypass the normal access
policy and gain emergency access to patient records. Since the
break-glass authority overrides the access policy and can freely
access patient’s medical data, the system users with constrained
access privilege may struggle to get the break-glass right in
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order to break through the constraint of the access policy. Thus,
the break-glass authority should be controlled and not abused.
Envisioning these specific requirements in the healthcare IoT
network, we propose a lightweight break-glass access control
(LiBAC) system, which simultaneously supports two types of
access control patterns: attribute-based access control for nor-
mal circumstance and break-glass access for emergency cir-
cumstance. The main contributions of the paper are listed as
follows.
1) Patient controlled encryption: In LiBAC, the healthcare
records are encrypted by the patients themselves. The
patient controlled encryption enables patients to enforce
access control policy in order to securely share records
among medical workers, family members, and friends.
2) Attribute-based access: Attribute-based encryption
(ABE) is used for fine-grained access control in the
healthcare IoT network. The family members and data
users, such as clinicians, researchers, and insurers, are
assigned secret keys bound to their respective sets of at-
tributes and, thus, have different data access privileges.
3) Break-glass access: LiBAC realizes password-based
break-glass access. A patient presets a password and pre-
shares it with a set of emergency contact persons (ECPs).
In an emergency situation, an ECP utilizes the password
to extract the break-glass key and decrypts the medical
files. This approach avoids abuse of break-glass authority
because only ECPs who know the password are capable
of extracting the break-glass key.
4) Lightweight construction: In order to reduce computation
and storage overhead in wireless healthcare IoTs, LiBAC
is designed to be lightweight in data transmission and
computations.
A. Related Work
1) ABE for Fine-Grained Access Control: In 2007, Ostro-
vsky et al. [8] proposed an ABE scheme with nonmonotonic
access structure, which is proved secure based on decisional bi-
linear Diffie–Hellman (DBDH) assumption. In order to reduce
the decryption overhead, Lai et al. [9] proposed to outsource a
significant portion of decryption operation to a public server and
presented an ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced decryp-
tion. The similar problem is also studied in [10]. If the malicious
user intentionally sells his decryption key for profit, it is neces-
sary to identity the traitor’s identity and deprive his decryption
privilege. This traitor tracing problem was investigated in [11].
Zhou et al. [12] put forth a multiauthority ABE with white-box
traceability for e-health systems. Rouselakis et al. [13] proposed
a large-universe multiauthority ABE to reduce the size of the
public parameter. Yang et al. [14] designed a lightweight ABE
for health IoT in distributed environment. Deng et al. [15] sug-
gested a hierarchical ABE with short ciphertext. Luo et al. [16]
proposed a hierarchical ABE with multiple authorities for the
mobile social network. The hierarchical ABE was also investi-
gated in [17]–[19].
2) Break-Glass Access Control: In 2009, Brucker et al. [20]
proposed a generic break-glass access control model based on
the notion of emergency levels, in which several emergency lev-
els were designed to classify various kinds of violations to the
regular policy. Later, Brucker et al. [21] integrated the break-
glass concept into the ABE security architecture, in which a
hierarchy of emergency attributes were utilized and deemed as
controlled overriding of the ordinary access control constrains.
Marinovic et al. [22] put forth a new break-glass access control
model named Rumpole. It leveraged a declarative request lan-
guage in the break-glass decision process, and required a policy
writer to restrict the time and mode to enable the break-glass ac-
cess. A generic process-related role-based access control model
with break-glass was suggested by Schefer et al. [23]. In 2016,
Maw et al. [24] proposed a break-glass access control model
for a wireless sensor network, which was also based on the
role model. It could detect the access policy violations from the
users. As [20]–[24] only gave out the break-glass access control
model without concrete construction, Zhang et al. [25] put forth
a password-controlled break-glass access control scheme, which
was constructed based on identity-based encryption and could
not exert fine-grained access control on the shared ciphertexts
in the normal situation.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Bilinear Pairing and Hardness Assumption
Let G and GT be cyclic groups and g1 be a generator of G.
The bilinear map e : G ×G → GT has the following charac-
teristics:
1) bilinear: ∀h1, h2 ∈ G and ∀a, b ∈ Zp , e(ha1 , hb2) =
e(h1, h2)ab ;
2) nondegenerate: e(g1, g1) = 1; and
3) computable: ∀h1, h2 ∈ G, e(h1, h2) can be efficiently
calculated.
DBDH assumption: Let a, b, c ∈ Zp and T ∈ GT be random
numbers, and g1 be a generator of G. Given a tuple y = (g1, ga1 ,
gb1 , g
c
1), no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A can dis-
tinguish e(g1, g1)abc from T with nonnegligible advantage. The
advantage  of A is defined as |Pr[A(y, e(g1, g1)abc) = 0]
− Pr[A(y, T ) = 0]|.
B. Linear Secret Sharing Scheme
Definition 1 (Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) [26]): A
secret-sharing scheme Π over a set of parties P is called linear
(over Zp ) if
1) The shares for each party form a vector over Zp .
2) There exists a matrix A with l rows and n columns called
the share-generating matrix for Π. For all i = 1, . . . , l,
the ith row Ai of the matrix A is labeled by a party ρ(i)
(ρ is a function from {1, . . . , l} to P). Set the column
vector v = (z, λ2, . . . , λn ), where z ∈ Zp is the secret to
be shared and λ2, . . . , λn ∈ Zp are randomly chosen. Av
is the vector of l shares of the secret z according to Π and
the share Aiv belongs to party ρ(i).
Suppose that Π is an LSSS for the access structure Φ. Let
S ∈ Φ be any authorized set and I ⊂ {1, . . . , l} be defined as
I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, there exists constants {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I
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Fig. 1. System architecture.
such that, if {zi}i∈I are valid shares of any secret z according
to Π, then
∑
i∈I ωizi = z and
∑
i∈I ωiAi = (1, 0, . . . , 0). Fur-
thermore, it is shown in [26] that these constants {ωi}i∈I can
be found in time polynomial in the size of the share-generating
matrix A. For unauthorized sets, no such constants exist.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND ITS MODEL
A. System Architecture
The architecture of LiBAC consists of a key generation cen-
ter (KGC), a cloud platform (CP), a healthcare infrastructure
provider (HIP), the patient (PA), the data users, and the ECP.
These entities and the interactions between them are shown in
Fig. 1 and introduced in the following.
KGC generates master public/secret key pair for the whole
system and attribute secret keys for the patients and the data
users.
CP has plenty storage and calculation capability, and provides
outsourced storage and computation service to its customers.
HIP can be the hospital or other medical institutions, who
provides IoT infrastructure to the patients. The medical devices
(such as electrocardiograph machine, B-ultrasound instrument,
electronic sphygmomanometer, and CT scanner) of the HIP are
connected to the Internet to form a healthcareIoT.
PA gets medical services from the HIP. The healthcare IoT
collects the physiological data and medical images of the pa-
tient, which are transmitted to a collection device through a
wireless network (see step 1 in Fig. 1). In order to protect the
sensitive medical data and realize fine-grained access control,
the patient specifies an access policy, which is utilized to en-
crypt the medical file (see step 2 in Fig. 1). Then, the encrypted
medical file is stored in CP via Internet (see step 3 in Fig. 1).
Considering the emergency situations, the patient generates a
password-based break-glass key such that all encrypted files of
the patient can be decrypted by the break-glass key. The patient
designates a list of ECPs to preshare the password with (see
step 4 in Fig. 1), which can be utilized to recover the break-
glass key.
Data users can be physicians, nurses, and other medical staff
in the HIP, or the friends and relatives of the patients. Each of
them registers with the KGC and receives the attribute secret
key according to their characteristics. They are able to access to
patient’s data if their attributes satisfy the access policies (see
step 5 in Fig. 1). Receiving the encrypted medical files from the
CP (see step 6 in Fig. 1), they utilize the attribute secret key (see
step 7 in Fig. 1) to decrypt and obtain the plaintext medical files
(see step 8 in Fig. 1).
ECPs are designated by the patient and know the patient’s
password. In an emergency situation, they interact with the CP
and HIP (see step 9 in Fig. 1) to recover the break-glass key
(see step 10 in Fig. 1). ECPs query a patient’s encrypted files
from CP (see step 11 in Fig. 1) and utilizes the break-glass key
to recover the patient’s medical records (see step 12 in Fig. 1).
B. Security Model
To ensure the security of the ABE encrypted medical files,
the system should be indistinguishable against chosen plaintext
attack (IND-CPA). The concrete security model can be found
in [9] and [10], in which an adversary cannot distinguish two
challenge ciphertexts given the two underlying plaintexts. The
IND-CPA security has two security levels: selective secure and
fully secure. In the selective security model, the adversary has
to output the challenge access policy before the system is set
up. In the fully security model, the adversary designates the
challenge access policy in the challenge phase rather than the
very beginning. It is obvious that the fully security model has
higher security level than the selective model. LiBAC is secure
in the fully security model.
To ensure the security of the break-glass access control mech-
anism, CP and HIP cannot collude. Patient’s password and
break-glass key can be used to decrypt all of the patient’s en-
crypted healthcare files, and should be protected in the following
two aspects:
1) The CP and HIP cannot deduce patient’s password or the
break-glass key from the auxiliary information that are
stored in CP and HIP.
2) In the break-glass key extraction process, ECP sends an
encapsulated password to CP and HIP. The system guar-
antees that CP and HIP still cannot get the password or
break-glass key when they obtain the encapsulated pass-
word.
IV. SYSTEM WORKFLOW
In this section, we briefly introduce the system workflow that
is different from the traditional ABE based access control pro-
posals. The break-glass key generation and extraction processes
as well as two types of access control mechanisms are illustrated.
A. Break-Glass Key Generation
Fig. 2 shows the break-glass key generation procedure. The
patient sets a password pw for his encrypted files (see step 1 in
Fig. 2), designates a ECP list (see step 2 in Fig. 2) and preshares
the password with the ECPs in the list (see step 3 in Fig. 2). The
ECP list is stored in HIP.
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Fig. 2. Break-glass key generation.
Fig. 3. Break-glass key extraction.
Then, the patient runs break-glass key generation algorithm
KeyGen.BK (see step 4 in Fig. 2) to derive the break-glass key
BK from the password pw (see step 5 in Fig. 2). Two auxiliary
messages (bk1, bk2) of the break-glass key are also generated,
which are the clues to recover the break-glass key BK from the
password pw. The auxiliary messages (bk1, bk2) of the break-
glass key are secretly stored by CP and HIP, respectively (see
step 6 in Fig. 2).
B. Break-Glass Key Extraction
Fig. 3 presents the break-glass key extraction procedure. If the
patient encounters emergency situations (see step 1 in Fig. 3),
ECP of the patient utilizes the password pw to extract the break-
glass key BK.
In order to protect the password, ECP utilizes the password
pw (see step 2 in Fig. 3) as input to generate an encapsulated
password (see step 3 in Fig. 3), which is sent to CP and HIP
(see step 4 in Fig. 3). Both the CP and HIP cannot deduce the
password pw from the encapsulated password. CP (resp. HIP),
with the auxiliary messages bk1 (resp. bk2) of the break-glass
key and the encapsulated password as input, computes and sends
an auxiliary recovery message Ψ1 (resp. Ψ2) to the ECP (see
step 5 in Fig. 3). Receiving these auxiliary recovery messages
Ψ1 and Ψ2 from CP and HIP, respectively, ECP recovers the
break-glass key BK (see step 6 in Fig. 3), which can decrypt all
the encrypted medical files of the patient.
C. Two Access Control Mechanisms
As shown in Fig. 4, LiBAC provides two access control
mechanisms for attribute-based access and break-glass access
and the following algorithms are involved: delegation key gen-
eration algorithm KeyGen.Del, partial decryption algorithm
Fig. 4. Two access control mechanisms.
PDec, break-glass key extraction algorithm Extract.BK,
type-1 decryption algorithm Dec1, and type-2 decryption al-
gorithm Dec2. These algorithms are detailed in Section V.
For the attribute based access, a data user utilizes his attribute
secret key SK to decrypt the ciphertext (see step 1 in Fig. 4).
In LiBAC, the outsourced decryption technique in [9] and [10]
is utilized to alleviate the data user’s decryption burden. The
data user inputs SK (see step 2 in Fig. 4) into the delegation key
generation algorithm KeyGen.Del to generate a delegation
key DK (see step 3 in Fig. 4), which is sent to the CP in an
authenticated manner (see step 4 in Fig. 4). In the data access
process, the CP partially decrypt the encrypted medical file on
the data user’s behalf. Using the the delegation key DK, CP runs
the partial decryption algorithm PDec (see step 5 in Fig. 4) to
transform the ciphertext CT into CT′ (see step 6 in Fig. 4).
Utilizing the attribute secret key SK, the data user runs type-1
decryption algorithm Dec1 to recover the plaintext medical file
(see step 7 in Fig. 4). In this process, the data user only need
to perform one exponential calculation to recover the message
from CT′.
For the break-glass access, ECP utilizes the password pw (see
step 8 in Fig. 4) and the break-glass key extraction algorithm
Extract.BK to recover the break-glass key BK (see step 9 in
Fig. 4). Then, ECP runs type-2 decryption algorithm Dec2 to
obtain the plaintext medical file (see step 10 in Fig. 4).
After the decryption algorithms, a verification method is pro-
vided to verify whether the recovered medical file is correct (see
step 11 in Fig. 4). The misbehavior of the CP or HIP, such as the
CP sends to the data user an incorrect CT′, or the CP (or HIP)
sends to ECP an incorrect auxiliary recovery message, can be
detected.
V. PROPOSED SYSTEM
In this section, we present a concrete LiBAC for the health-
care IoT. The notation a ∈R S represents that an element a is
randomly selected from a set S.
A. System Setup
Taken as input the security parameter 1κ , the KGC generates
the master public/secret keys MPK/MSK for the system.
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Setup(1κ) → (MPK,MSK): KGC chooses hash func-
tions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p , H2 : {0, 1}∗ → GT , H3 : {0, 1}∗ →
K and cryptographically secure symmetric encryption and de-
cryption pair SEnc/SDec with secret key space K. Select
α, β ∈R Z∗p , g1 ∈R G and compute g2 = gβ1 , Y = e(g1, g1)α .
Set MPK = (g1, g2, Y ) and MSK = (α, β). MPK is a de-
fault input in the following algorithms.
B. Key Generation for User
Each user is assigned a set of attributes S based on his/her
position in the healthcare system and based on the set of at-
tributes, KGC generates the attribute secret key SK for the user.
Note that a user can be a patient or a data user.
KeyGen.User(MSK,S) → SK: Suppose the user’s
attribute set S = (attr1, attr2, . . . , attrk ). Compute σi =
H1(attri) ∈ Z∗p for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Select u, r1, r2, τ ∈R Z∗p and
compute sk1 = gα−u1 , sk2,i = g
u(σi +β )−1
1 , sk3 = r1, sk4 = r2,
sk5 = τ . Set SK = (sk1, {sk2,i}i∈[k ], sk3, sk4, sk5).
C. Delegation Key Generation
A user generates delegation key DK from the attribute secret
key SK. Then, DK is sent to the CP in authenticated manner.
KeyGen.Del(SK) → DK: The user calculates dk1 =
sksk51 , dk2,i = sk
sk5
2,i , dk3 = g
sk3
1 , dk4 = g
sk4
2 , and sets DK =
(dk1, {dk2,i}i∈[k ], dk3, dk4).
D. Password-Based Break-Glass Key Generation
A patient (with identity IDPA ) selects a password pw and
generates a break-glass key BK based on pw. At the same time,
the auxiliary information (bk1, bk2) of break-glass key are gen-
erated, which are used to recover the BK from the password
pw. Then, bk1 and bk2 are sent to CP and HIP, respectively. The
patient designates a list of ECPs and secretly preshares his/her
password pw with the ECPs. The ECP list is stored in HIP.
KeyGen.BK(pw) → (BK, bk1, bk2). The patient com-
putes ζ = H1(IDPA , pw) and chooses random ζ1, ζ2 ∈R Z∗p
such that ζ = ζ1 + ζ2. Selects K,K1 ∈R G and sets the break-
glass key as BK = K.
CP randomly selects θ1 ∈R Z∗p , calculates PCP = gθ11 and
sends PCP to the patient. HIP randomly selects θ2 ∈R Z∗p , cal-
culates PHIP = gθ21 , and sends PHIP to the patient. Receiving
(PCP , PHIP), the patient selects r ∈R Z∗p and calculates
K2 = K · (K1)−1 · (PCP · PHIP)r
Λ1 = (PHIP)−2ζ1 · g−r1 , Λ2 = (PCP)−2ζ2 · g−r1 .
Set break-glass key auxiliary messages as bk1 = (K1,Λ1), bk2
= (K2,Λ2), which are sent to CP and HIP, respectively.
CP securely stores (bk1, PCP , θ1) and HIP securely stores
(bk2, PHIP, θ2).
E. Password-Based Break-Glass Key Extraction
An ECP of the patient interacts with the CP and HIP to extract
the break-glass key BK using the password pw.
Extract.BK(pw, bk1, bk2) → BK: Receiving the break-
glass key extraction request, CP and HIP, respectively, sends
PCP , PHIP to ECP. Then, ECP chooses s ∈R Z∗p and calcu-
lates ζ = H1(IDPA , pw), Γ1 = (PHIP)ζ · gs1 , Γ2 = (PCP)ζ · gs1 .
The elements (Γ1,Γ2) are sent to CP and HIP, respectively.
CP computes Ψ1 = K1 · (Λ1 · Γ1)θ1 , and HIP computes Ψ2 =
K2 · (Λ2 · Γ2)θ2 , which are sent to the ECP. Then, ECP recov-
ers the break-glass key by computing BK = (Ψ1 ·Ψ2) · (PCP ·
PHIP)−s .
F. Encryption
A patient uses an access policy (A, ρ) and the break-glass key
BK to encrypt a medical file M (with file identity FID), where
A ∈ Zl×np , ρ maps A’s rows to attributes.
Enc(M, (A, ρ), SKP A ,BK) → CT: The patient chooses
z, λ2, . . . , λn ∈R Z∗p and sets v = (z, λ2, . . . , λn )
. Com-
pute zi = Aiv for i ∈ [l]. The ciphertext CT is constructed
as Υ = H2(BK, IDPA , F ID), C0 = Υ · Y z , C1 = gz1 , C2,i =
ρ(i)zi/r1, C3,i = zi/r2, CM = SEnc(H3(Υ),M ||0 ), where
M ||0 denotes -0s are concatenated after M . Set CT =
(CM ,C0, C1, {C2,i , C3,i}i∈[l]) and outsource (CT, (A, ρ)) to
CP for remote storage.
G. Partial Decryption
Receiving the data access request from a data user, CP verifies
whether the data user’s attribute set satisfies the access policy of
the ciphertext. If it does not, the request is rejected. Otherwise,
CP utilizes the delegation key DK of the data user to partially
decrypt the ciphertext. The purpose of the partial decryption is
to reduce the data user’s decryption burden.
1) PDec(CT,DK) → CT ′: CP utilizes the LSSS mecha-
nism (introduced in Section II-B) to find a set of constants
{ωi ∈ Zp}i∈[l] such that
∑
i ωiAi = (1, 0, . . . , 0). Then, CP
calculates
Ω = e(C1, dk1)e
(
dk3,
∏
i∈I
dkC2, i ·ωi2,i
)
e
(
dk4,
∏
i∈I
dkC3, i ·ωi2,i
)
= e(g1, g1)α ·z ·τ
and sends the transformed ciphertext CT′ = (CM ,C0,Ω) to data
user.
H. Decryption With Attribute Key and Verification
In the normal situation, a data user utilizes his attribute secret
key SK and type-1 decryption algorithm Dec1 to recover the
plaintext, and then verifies its correctness.
Dec1(CT ′, SK) → M/⊥: The data user computes Υ = C0 ·
Ω−sk5 and M ′ = SDec(H3(Υ), CM ). If M ′ = M ||0 , it means
that the transformed ciphertext CT′ is correct and the recovered
plaintext medical file is M . Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
I. Decryption With Break-Glass Key and Verification
In an emergency situation, ECP utilizes the break-glass key
BK and type-2 decryption algorithm Dec2 to decrypt the cipher-
text.
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Dec2(CT,BK) → M/⊥: ECP computes Υ = H2(BK,
IDPA , FID) and M ′ = SDec(H3(Υ), CM ). If M ′ = M ||0 ,
it means that the break-glass key BK is correctly extracted
and the recovered plaintext medical file is M . Otherwise, it
outputs ⊥.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 1: Assume that the DBDH assumption holds, then
LiBAC is fully IND-CPA secure.
Proof: Suppose there is an adversary A that can distinguish
different ciphertexts. Then, we can build an algorithm C to
break the DBDH assumption, who is given the DBDH tuple
y = (g1, ga1 , g
b
1 , g
c
1).
1) Setup: The challenger C selects α′, β ∈R Z∗p and implic-
itly sets α = α′ + ab. Compute Y = e(ga1 , gb1)e(g1, g1)α
′
= e(g1, g1)α and g2 = gβ1 . C sends the master public key
MPK = (g1, g2, Y ) to A.
2) Phase 1: A adaptively issues the following queries:
a) OSK:A queries on the attribute secret key of attribute
set S (with |S| = k). C chooses r1, r2, τ, u′ ∈R Z∗p
and implicitly sets u = ab + u′b, C picks ki ∈R Z∗p
such that ki is invertible in Z∗p for i ∈ [k]. Implicitly
set σi = b · k−1i − β and constructs sk3 = r1, sk4 =
r2, sk5 = τ ,
sk1 = gα−u1 = g
(α ′+ab)−(ab+u ′b)
1
= gα
′−u ′b
1 = g
α ′
1 · (gb1)u
′
sk2,i = gu(σi +β )
−1
1 = g
(ab+u ′b)(b·k−1i −β+β )−1
1
= g(ab+u
′b)(ki ·b−1)
1 = g
ki (a+u ′)
1
= (ga1 )
ki · gki ·u ′1
The secret key SK = (sk1, {sk2,i}i∈[k ], sk3, sk4,
sk5) is sent to A.
b) ODK: A queries on the delegation key of data
user with attribute set S. C runs OSK to construct
the attribute secret key SK and computes dk1 =
sksk51 , dk2,i = sk
sk5
2,i , dk3 = g
sk3
1 , dk4 = g
sk4
2 . The
constructed delegation key DK = (dk1, {dk2,i}i∈[k ],
dk3, dk4) is sent to A.
c) OP Dec : A issues partial decryption query on ci-
phertext CT for data user with attribute set S.
C runs ODK to construct the delegation key DK.
C computes Ω = e(C1, dk1)e(dk3,
∏
i∈I dk
C2, i ·ωi
2,i )
e(dk4,
∏
i∈I dk
C3, i ·ωi
2,i ). Then, CT′ = (CM ,C0,Ω) is
sent to A.
d) ODec1 : A issues type-1 decryption query on cipher-
text CT for data user with attribute set S. C runs
OP Dec to construct the transformed ciphertext CT′
and OSK to construct the attribute secret key SK. C
computes Υ = C0 · Ω−sk5 and SDec(H3(Υ), CM ) to
recover the message M .
3) Challenge: A sends an access policy (A∗, ρ∗), a mes-
sage M ∗ and two challenge data (Υ∗0,Υ∗1) to C, where
TABLE I
COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON
Parameter LiBAC [8] [11]
|MPK| |G|+ |GT | (2U + 3)|G| 6|G|+ |GT |
|SK| (|S |+ 1)|G|+
3|Zp |
(5|S |)|G| (2|S |+ 3)|G|+ |Zp |
|CT| |G|+ |GT |+
(2l)|Zp |
(2l + 1)|G|+ |GT | (3l + 2)|G|+ |GT |
|BK| |G| ⊥ ⊥
|bk1|/|bk2| 2|G| ⊥ ⊥
A∗ ∈ Zl∗×n∗p and ρ∗ maps A∗’s rows to attributes. The
constraint is that the secret attribute key of attribute
set S that satisfies (A∗, ρ∗) is not queried in phase 1.
C selects z∗i ∈R Z∗p for 1 ≤ i ≤ l∗. C tosses a coin
μ ∈ {0, 1} and computes C∗0 = Υ∗μ · T · e(gc , gα
′
), C∗1 =
gc1 , C
∗
2,i = ρ(i)z
∗
i /r1, C
∗
3,i = z
∗
i /r2. Set k∗SE = H3(Υ∗μ).
Compute CM ∗ = SEnc(k∗SE ,M ∗||0 ), where || denotes
concatenation of a string. The challenge ciphertext CT∗ =
(CM ∗ , C∗0 , C
∗
1 , {C∗2,i , C∗3,i}i∈[l]) is sent to A.
4) Phase 2: It is the same as Phase 1 with the constraint that
S does not satisfy (A∗, ρ∗).
5) Guess: A outputs a guess μ′ ∈ {0, 1}. If μ′ = μ, C out-
puts 1 indicating T = e(g1, g1)abc . Otherwise, it outputs
0 indicating T is random. 
Next, we analyze the security of break-glass access control.
1) The CP (resp. HIP) is unable to get patient’s pw or
BK from the auxiliary information bk1 = (K1,Λ1) (resp.
bk2 = (K2,Λ2)). Since Λ1 = (PHIP)−2ζ1 · g−r1 , CP can-
not deduce ζ1 from Λ1 because r is an unknown random
number. CP are not capable to deduce BK = K from K1
either. The security analysis of HIP is similar as CP.
2) In the break-glass key extraction phase, the CP (resp. HIP)
is unable to get patient’s pw or BK from the encapsulated
password Γ1 (resp. Γ2). Since Γ1 = (PHIP)ζ · gs1 and ζ =
H1(IDPA , pw), CP cannot deduce ζ from Γ1 because s
is an unknown random number. The security analysis of
HIP is similar as CP.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We compare LiBAC with the existing ABE schemes [8], [11]
in terms of communication and computation overheads. We
implement these schemes using the pairing based based crypto
(PBC) library [27] to evaluate their efficiencies. The type-A
elliptic curve is selected. The experiments are conducted on PC
with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6200U CPU @ 2.3 GHz, 4 GB RAM
and running Windows 10 64-bit operation system.
Table I and Fig. 5(a)–(c) compare the communication over-
head of these schemes. The notations |G|, |GT |, and |Zp | repre-
sent the bit length of the element in G, GT , and Zp , respectively.
The notations |MPK|, |SK|, and |CT| denote the sizes of the
master public key MPK, user’s attribute secret key SK and ci-
phertext CT, respectively. |U | represent the size of the universe
attribute set. l is the row number of the access policy matrix
A and |S| is the size of user’s attribute set. For type-A elliptic
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Fig. 5. Communication and computation efficiency. (a) Master public
key size. (b) Secret key size. (c) Ciphertext size. (d) KeyGen:User time.
(e) Encryption time. (f) Dec1 time.
curve, the bit length of an element in G, GT , and Zp are 1024,
1024, and 160 bit, respectively.
1) Master public key size: Fig. 5(a) shows the master public
key size of the three schemes. LiBAC is a large universe
construction since the master public key size is a con-
stant and has no constraint on the size of the universe
attribute set. The advantage of large universe construc-
tion is that new attribute can be added after the system is
set up. Another merit is that the storage space is small for
resource-limited IoT devices. The MPK in LiBAC con-
sists of one element in group G and one element in group
GT , and the bit length of MPK is 0.256 KB. The size of
MPK in scheme [11] is also a constant and has 0.896 KB,
which is two times larger than LiBAC. The master public
key in scheme [8] linearly grows with the size |U | of the
universe attribute set. When |U | = 100, the size of MPK
is 25.984 KB in scheme [8], which is 100.5 times larger
than LiBAC.
2) Attribute secret key size: Fig. 5(b) shows the attribute
secret key size of the users. It is obvious that LiBAC
has the least size. When the size of attribute set grows to
100, the sizes of SK are 64, 26.004, and 12.988 KB in [8],
[11] and LiBAC, respectively. The sizes of SK in [8], [11]
are 3.9 and 1 times larger than LiBAC when |S| = 100,
respectively.
TABLE II
COMPUTATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON
Algorithm LiBAC [8] [11]
KeyGen.User (|S |+ 1)te1 (6|S |)te1 (4|S |+ 4)te1
Enc te1 + te2 tp + te2 + (2l
+ 1)te1
tp + te2 + (5l
+ 2)te1
Dec1 te1 3|S |tp
+ |S |te1 +
2|S |te2
(3|S |+ 1)tp
+ (|S |+ 1)te1
+ |S |te2
PDec 3tp + (2l)te1 ⊥ ⊥
KeyGen.BK 6te1 ⊥ ⊥
Extract.BK 6te1 ⊥ ⊥
3) Ciphertext size: Fig. 5(c) shows the ciphertext size.
LiBAC also has the least ciphertext size. When the size
of attribute set grows to 100, the sizes of CT are 25.856,
38.784, and 4.256 KB in [8], [11] and LiBAC, respec-
tively. The sizes of CT in [8] and [11] are five and eight
times larger than LiBAC when |S| = 100, respectively.
4) Break-glass key and its auxiliary information size: The
schemes in [8] and [11] do not have break-glass access
function nor break-glass key. The sizes of BK, bk1, and
bk2 are 0.128, 0.256, and 0.256 KB in LiBAC, respec-
tively.
Table II and Fig. 5(d)–(f) compare the computation overhead
of these schemes. Let te1 , te2 , and tp denote the operation times
of a exponentiation computation in G, a exponentiation compu-
tation in GT and a pairing computation, respectively.
1) KeyGen.User: Fig. 5(d) shows the computation effi-
ciency of KeyGen.User algorithm of these schemes.
LiBAC has the least computation cost. When |S| = 100,
the running times of KeyGen.User are 5.504, 3.706, and
0.926 s in [8], [11], and LiBAC, respectively. The run-
ning times of KeyGen.User in [8] and [11] are 4.9 and
3 times larger than LiBAC when |S| = 100, respectively.
2) Enc: Fig. 5(e) shows the computation efficiency of Enc
algorithm of these schemes. When |S| = 100, the running
times ofEnc are 1.864, 4.625, and 0.012 s in [8], [11], and
LiBAC, respectively. LiBAC has the far less execution
time for Enc algorithm. The running times of Enc in [8]
and [11] are 154 and 384 times larger than LiBAC when
|S| = 100, respectively.
3) Dec1: Fig. 5(f) shows the computation efficiency of Dec1
algorithm of these schemes. When |S| = 100, the running
times of Dec1 are 6.842, 6.611, and 0.009 s in [8], [11],
and LiBAC, respectively. The running times of Dec1 in
[8] and [11] are 759 and 733 times larger than LiBAC
when |S| = 100, respectively.
4) KeyGen.BK, Extract.BK, and Dec2: In LiBAC, the
break-glass key generation and extraction processes are
lightweight, which take only six exponentiation computa-
tions in group G and the execution time is merely 0.055 s.
The ECP can utilizes two hash function to recover the
symmetric key of the ciphertext and the execution time is
0.021 s.
To conclude, LiBAC incurs much smaller communication
and computation costs compared with other schemes. This
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lightweight system is applicable for the resource-constrained
devices in healthcare IoT network.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a lightweight data sharing system
for healthcare IoT with two access control modes. In attribute-
based access mode, authorized data users use their attribute
secret keys to decrypt and access patient’s medical records.
In break-glass access mode, a patient preshares a password
with a set of ECPs and the password is the clue to recover
the break-glass key. In emergency circumstance, an ECP uti-
lizes the password to extract the break-glass key, and decrypts
the medical records to save patient’s life. Based on the DBDH
assumption, encrypted medical records are secure in the sense
that they are indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attacks.
The break-glass key generation and extraction algorithms leak
no information about the password and break-glass key. Our
performance evaluation and computer simulation results indi-
cated that LiBAC is lightweight and suitable to be deployed in
healthcare IoT networks.
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